JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The article traces the development of 'moral panic' in the media, where it was first used pejoratively, then rejected for being pejorative, and finally rehabilitated as a term of approval. It explains why the term developed as it did: how it enabled journalists to justify the moral and social role of the media, and also to support the reassertion of 'family values' in the early l990s.
examination of the various meanings of the term, that sociologists need to be more rigorous in its use and more sensitive to its hidden implications. In particular, I doubt whether Goode and Ben-Yehuda are justified in treating it as a homogeneous concept and in attempting to construct a grand unified theory of moral panic. A personal apologia seems necessary, as I am a historian, not a sociologist, uneasily aware of the tension between the empirical method in which I was trained and the more theoretical approach which I adopt here. This is intended as an interdisciplinary work, an encounter between two academic traditions that meet too seldom, to the disadvantage of both.
While this article was being written, the problem of 'moral panic' took on a new dimension. The term has appeared occasionally in the national press for at least ten years, but suddenly came to prominence in 1993, as a survey of the broadsheet newspapers demonstrates. FT Profile, a computer database covering most of the national press from the late 1980s, lists eleven uses of the term in 1989, twelve in 1990, eight in 1991 and seventeen in 1992, but eighty-nine in 1993. This, as we shall see, has implications for the academic use of the term, for, asJean Aitchison has argued, newspapers do not initiate linguistic change so much as 'push the language along further in the direction in which it was already going', and sociologists must therefore bear some responsibility for the use of 'moral panic' in the media. (Aitchison 1994: 19) The media's heightened sensitivity to moral issues may be just a temporary phase, one of a series of media debates about 'moral decline' that have gone on since the 1960s, flaring up and quickly dying down again. But in looking at 'moral panic' in the context of this wider debate on public morals, this article will also consider the possibility that the potent association of morality with panic may have a permanent effect on the moral language used by the media.
'INTEREST-GROUP' THEORY

Discussion of moral panic properly begins with Stanley Cohen's Folk Devils and MoralPanics (1972), a classic sociological study of the Mods and Rockers phenomenon of the mid-1960s. Cohen offered the following definition of the term:
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.
Several details of Cohen's thesis have proved particularly influential. The first is the idea that every moral panic has its scapegoat, the 'folk devil' onto whom public fears and fantasies are projected. The moral panic must have an object; it must be about something. This does not mean that the folk devil is created by the moral panic. Cohen was at pains to point out that 'despite using terms such as "panic" and analogies from the study of mass hysteria and delusion' he did not mean to imply that the Mods and Rockers would not have existed if there had been no moral panic or 'would have gone away if we had simply ignored them', only that turning them into folk devils was an inappropriate solution to the problem. That 'problem', however, was not the activities of the Mods and Rockers, or only in a limited and temporary sense; the underlying cause of the moral panic was the 'cultural strain and ambiguity' caused by social change. The object of the moral panic was not so much the Mods and Rockers as the post-war affluence and sexual freedom that they represented; consequently, the Mods and Rockers were forgotten within a few years, and new folk devils emerged to replace them. Recent writers have gone further than Cohen in emphasizing the arbitrary selection of folk devils. Nowadays, the term 'folk devil' is more likely to be applied to vulnerable figures such as unmarried mothers or people with AIDS, or to contestable phenomena such as the satanic abuse of children, than to aggressively deviant or anti-social groups such as the Mods and Rockers. One linguistic result of this has been the conflation of the moral panic and the folk devil. Single mothers, wroteJulie Burchill in the Mail on Sunday (15 August 1993), 'have taken over from "drug pushers" (an equally florid, unrealistic myth) as society's main folk devil and moral panic'. This implies that the moral panic is not about the folk devil; the moral panic is the folk devil, or, to put it another way, the folk devil would not be perceived as a problem -might not even exist at all -without the moral panic.
Another influential aspect of Cohen's thesis is the argument that moral panics are generated by the media, or by particular interest-groups (Cohen, following Howard Becker, calls them 'moral entrepreneurs') using the media to publicize their concerns. An example of this approach can be found in PhilipJenkins's recent book Intimate Enemies: Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain (1992) which identified various interest-groups, including charities, the police and social workers, who made claims about the sexual and ritual abuse of children which were then 'taken up by a sig nificant section of the mass media and presented as factual'. Cohen, however, laid particular stress on the media itself, as an 'especially important carrier and producer of moral panics'. Most commentators, even those within the media, have tended to agree. As the Financial Times commented on 13 March 1993:
That the British media exercise a uniquely decisive influence on national political life has been notably demonstrated in recent days: in no other country would what has been termed the 'moral panic' over juvenile crime have provided the basis of such a concerted campaign that led to almost instant action on the part of the government.
While this was a cause of alarm to some writers, others were inclined to celebrate the power of the press to initiate a moral panic on an issue of public importance. 'Name an issue', wrote MartinJacques in the Sunday Times on 7 March 1993, and it is more than likely that the newspapers have been responsible for making it happen: the moral panic over the state of society, economic policy . . . the royal family . . . It is no exaggeration to say that without the press none of these issues would have acquired the importance they have.
Perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of Cohen's thesis, however, is the remark that 'the processes by which moral panics and folk devils are generated do not date'. This has encouraged historians to transport the concept of moral panic into other periods. Rob Sindall, for example, employs the term as 'a useful analytical tool' in his study of street violence in the nineteenth century, on the assumption that 'Cohen's model is ... applicable over time', the only precondition for a moral panic being the existence of a mass media capable of transmitting it. (Sindall 1990 However, their model of moral panic was designed to plug some of the gaps in Cohen's use of the term: in particular, to explain where moral panics originated and why they occurred when they did. Cohen implied that moral panics originated in the media, in ways that depended on established patterns of crime reporting, on journalists' own perceptions of a 'good story', or simply on the absence of any alternative news; in short, 'the media created the news and images which lent the cognitive basis for the panic'. Hall and his co-authors agreed that the media were 'among the most powerful forces in the shaping of public consciousness about topical and controversial issues'. But they went on to argue that moral panics about law and order typically originated in statements by members of the police and the judiciary, which were then amplified by the media. The media does not 'create' the news so much as 'reproduce and sustain' the dominant interpretations of it, and can thus be said to function, consciously or not, as an instrument of state control (Hall et al. 1978 : 220-2).
The two theories of moral panic differ in other ways. Cohen adopts a studied neutralit in his discussion of moral panic, and although his own sympathies can quite easily be inferred, they are never spelt out. He refrains, too, from drawing firm conclusions about the 'policy implications' of his work, merely commenting that 'different readers can draw different implications' and that 'sociologists do not have the power to stop such implications being made or acted upon'. The authors of Policing the Cr7sis, on the other hand, incorporate in their definition of a moral panic the notion of an irrational or unjustified response. 'When the official reaction to a person, group of persons or series of events is out of all preportion to the actual threat offered', and when the media representations universally stress 'sudden and dramatic' increases (in numbers involved or events) and 'novelty', above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a maralpanic. (p. 16) This is a much more partisan definition of moral panic, signalling an entirely different purpose; for whereas Cohen is pessimistic about the chances of breaking the cycle of repeated moral panics, Hall and his coauthors regard their work as an 'intervention' in 'the struggle to change the structures and conditions' by which moral panics are produced (p. x).
By laying stress on particular 'structures and conditions', Policing the Cnsis also calls into question the timelessness of moral panics, their apparently endless recurrence over the whole course of history. It treats the succession of moral panics between the early 1960s and the late 1970s, between the emergence of moral panics and their incorporation into a general panic about law and order, as an 'exceptional moment' in a long-term historical process. To use Marxist (more precisely, Gramscian) terminology, that process is the 'crisis of hegemony', the breakdown of consensus which forces the ruling class to resort to new techniques of exercising control and repressing dissent. This marks another departure from Cohen's original theory. Hall and his co-authors are far stricter in defining the historical circumstances under which moral panics occur, although they share with Cohen a sense of the inevitability of moral panics once the appropriate conditions are met. They do not go so far as to suggest that the 'mugging' panic could not have occurred before the 1970s, but they argue that 'it makes a great deal more sense' than it would have done at an earlier period, because only by the 1970s were all the 'essential conditions' in place. Other left-wing commentators have also tried to give the concept of moral panic greater historical specificity, though with slightly different emphases. Kate Marshall, for example, associates moral panics with the economic recession of the 1980s and the need to transfer the cost of the Welfare State onto private families (Marshall 1985) .
Goode and Ben-Yehuda's account of the 'elite-engineered' model is that the ruling classes 'deliberately and consciously' create a moral panic about 'an issue that they recognise not to be terribly harmful to the society as a whole' in order to divert attention from more serious problems. As the New Statesman explained in December 1993, moral panics are 'diversions for those in power who prefer that the "social and moral community" is not examined too closely for fear it is found bankrupt'. Policing the Crisis actually takes a less conspiratorial view of this process, pointing to 'evidence . . . that in this period the ruling classes themselves substantially believed the definition of an emergent social crisis which they were propagating' (Hall et al. 1978: 220) . But the conspiratorial reading alerts us to the fact that, as far as Policing the Crisis is concerned, moral panics are political phenomena and are generated, whether 'deliberately and consciously' or not, through political and juridical activity. This is quite different from the view of Folk Devils and Moral Panics that moral panics are the product of 'cultural strain and ambiguity'. As Cohen puts it, in reviewing the differences between his theory of moral panic and that of Policing the Crisis, the level of explanation 'is shifted from social control agencies or culturesor vague allusions to the "wider society" -to the specific operation of the state' (Cohen 1980: xxiii) .
This distinction between cultural and political models of moral panic may seem dubious. The two categories, after all, are not mutually exclusive: for Cohen, political agents are incorporated in the notion of a control culture, while for Hall and his co-authors, hegemony is as much a matter of cultural as of political dominance. However, Cohen also suggests that 'cases of mass hysteria, delusion and panics' might provide a framework for the study of moral panics, implying that the moral panic was a form of collective irrationality which must have deep cultural or psychological roots, and for which a purely political or ideological explanation would be inadequate. (Cohen 1980 :11) This is the sort of language, unattached to any historical period, that leads Hall et al. to reject the concept of a control culture as 'too imprecise', preferring instead to set moral panics in the context of a specific moment in history and 'a specific type of political regime' (Hall et al. 1978: 195) .
'GRASSROOTS' THEORY
Goode and Ben-Yehuda identify a third theory which stresses the extent of popular participation in moral panics and which they term the 'grassroots model'. According to this theory, 'politicians and the media cannot fabricate concern where none existed initially', and moral panics must therefore be founded on genuine public concern, reflected or magnified by the media, perhaps, but arising more or less spontaneously. This is a 'bottom up' rather than 'top down' theory of moral panic; the authors of Policing the Crisis, by contrast, are sceptical about 'this seemingly spontaneous public opinion' and argue that it is 'transmitted and constructed higher up in the chain of communication' instead of being generated from below (Hall et al. 1978: 137; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994: 127).
The 'grassroots' theory resembles the work of so-called 'realist criminologists' such as TrevorJones, Brian Maclean andJockYoung, co-authors of The Islington Crime Survey (1986), who suggest that people's perceptions of crime 'are not based on moral panic and/or a regurgitation of media stereotypes, but bear a close relationship to the real facts about the areas in which they live'. Realist criminologists tend to be unhappy with the term 'moral panic', identifying 'moral realism', rather than panic or hysteria, in people's attitudes to crime. However, they do not simply reject the concept of moral panic. In their view, moral panic and moral realism are symptoms of the same problem, signs that crime really is on the increase.
The same forces which make for the increase in crime fuel a moral panic about crime. That is, the real fear about crime is intimately related to the moral hysteria about crime. It not only provides a rational kernel for alarm, but its genesis lies at the same source; and the mass media serve and exaggerate such public fears. (Lea and Young 1993: 49, 263) This leaves the status of moral panic slightly ambiguous. The line between 'fear' and 'hysteria', 'alarm' and 'panic', is a fine one: if it is rational to be alarmed about crime, it may also, perhaps, be rational to panic. One of the most telling objections to Policing the Crzsis was that it treated the moral panic as an irrational or disproportionate response to a situation, without providing any 'criteria of proportionality' to distinguish it from a rational response (Waddington 1986 ). The realist criminologists solve this problem rather neatly by eliminating the need for any such distinction.
In shifting the focus of attention away from the utterances of politicians, journalists and other professionals to the attitudes and opinions of the general public, the 'grassroots' model marks a significant departure from previous theories of moral panic. However, it can also be seen as continuing and developing some of the themes of Cohen's original definition. Its proponents have tended, like Cohen, to treat moral panic as a cultural phenomenon. Stuart A. Scheingold, in The Politics of Law and Order (1984), argues that moral panics about street crime are rooted in a 'myth of crime and punishment' that has little to do with the actual incidence of crime but is sustained by the pervasive 'cultural presence' of violence in contemporary American society. In a discussion of the moral panic in Sweden caused by a proposal to provide clean syringes to intravenous drug users, Arthur Gould suggests that an analysis of 'political, ideological and institutional factors' is incomplete without reference to the 'wider social structure and culture' and, in particular, the sense that Swedish national identity was under threat. Unlike Cohen, Scheingold and Gould treat moral panics as the product of a diffuse sense of crisis, not obviously in the interests of any particular group. As with Cohen, however, there is a timelessness about their view of moral panic: they emphasize the cultural factors which make it inevitable that similar moral panics will occur again in the future, regardless of social or political trends. Scheingold suggests that there are 'cultural constants' in American society which favour the development of punitive policies on law and order (Scheingold 1984 , Gould 1994 .
A tentative genealogy of moral panic, then, would depict Cohen's original theory as the parent of two other, mutually opposing theories. One (the 'elite-engineered') theory accepts Cohen's suggestion that moral panics serve the interests of particular groups, but rejects the idea that they have deep-seated cultural causes; the other (the 'grassroots' theory) accepts Having begun by dismissing the idea of moral panic, Anderson ended up by endorsing it. Over the next ten years, the use of 'moral panic' in the national press would follow the same trajectory.
In the course of the 1980s the term was applied to a wide variety of issues, including AIDS, child abuse, crowd violence at football matches, drug addiction, juvenile crime and surrogate mothers. Moral panic was attriS uted either to the media alone ('a Fleet Street moral panic') or to a mood of public concern created by the media ('The public's moral panic is accompanied by a good deal of misinformation'). The term was almost always used pejoratively. 'Moral fervour often breeds and benefits from moral panic', declared one writer in the Guardian on 12July 1985. 'In conditions of such alarm, informed and sustained debate seems to go by the board.' Most of the references to 'moral panic' in the mid-1980s occurred in the Guardian or in left-wing weeklies such as the New Statesman and New Society, but by the end of the decade the term had made its way into other broadsheet newspapers and was beginning to be treated as a commonplace. At first, quotations from academics were used to establish the credentials of an unfamiliar term: "'What we are witnessing is a moral panic," says Michael Some attempts were made to recapture the term, often by readers responding, through the letters pages, to applications of 'moral panic' that they disagreed with. Thus the Independent on Sunday's editorial was followed, a week later, by a reader's letter castigating it for 'a misunderstanding of the valuable concept of "moral panic"' and reiterating Cohen's theory of folk devils: 'popular concerns' (in this case, 'widespread concern about the state of British society arising from the Bulger case') was taken up by 'politicians and the media', turned into a moral panic and directed against 'scapegoats'. Forced onto the defensive, the writer was prepared to concede that moral panics were an exaggerated version of 'popular concerns' about real social problems. ProfessorJock Young put forward a similar argument in a letter to the Guardian on 8 June 1994, in which he attempted, not altogether successfully, to gloss over the ambiguities of 'moral panic'. 'Sociologists in Britain coined the term', he suggested, to refer to cases where public reaction was completely disproporiionate to the actual problem faced . . . At no point was it suggested that such a term should be used to blank out and denigrate genuine fears and concerns about crime. These attempts to contest and to regulate the definition of moral panic failed to dispel the ambiguity of the term. It was an ambiguity which could sometimes come in useful. It enabled the film censorJames Ferman, interviewed in the Independent (13 August 1993), to offer a sop to both liberal and conservative readers: 'We seem to go through a wave of moral panics in Britain, but there's always something at the heart of it.' It helped The Times (leading article, 23 May 1994) to sell the idea of a 'new politics of social responsibility' to readers who might be suspicious of moral coercion: 'Though it is easy for a nation to slip into moral panic unnecessarily, the concern which is felt by ordinary people about such issues can no longer be ignored by those who represent them'. This ambivalence about 'moral panic' illustrates the writer's doubts about the popular credibility of moral language -a problem neatly encapsulated in William Oddie's description of the 'back to basics' campaign as 'a kind of controlled moral panic' ( The Times 20 March 1994) . At other times, of course, the ambiguity was accidental and simply led to confusion, as different meanings of 'moral panic' came into collision. Writing in the London Review of Books in 1993, Marina Warner referred to incest as 'one of the dominant focuses of moral panic'; she evidently intended to use the term in a neutral, descriptive sense, but one reader interpreted it differently, assuming that 'moral panic' was a pejorative term, and accusing Warner of condoning incest (LRB 7 October and 4 November 1993). In examining the recent and current use of the term, several features stand out. The first is the assumption that moral panic is a cultural Murray was correct to suggest that 'moral panic' was on the retreat. Writers who used the term in a manner consistent with the 'interest-group' or 'elitesngineered' theories did so more cautiously, even apologetically. 'Though the concept of the moral panic has been somewhat discredited of late (or at least found wanting), it still has its uses', ventured a reviewer in the Guardian on 28 January 1995. The growing recognition of the 'grassroots' theory led to its appearance in the Daily Mail on 11 March 1995, one of the first occasions on which the term 'moral panic' had appeared in a tabloid newspaper. Following Murray, the subject under discussion was, once again, the threat to the two-parent family.
Perhaps the time has come when we should not be ashamed of standing up for old-fashioned values, merely because of taunts that we are succumbing to a 'moral panic'. We need, for the sake of all our children, to foster a sense of community which depends on these traditional values. (Cohen 1980: 70) . Once again, however, the problem is most acute in the 'grassroots' theory of moral panic, with its assumption that the media reflects, though in a distorting mirror, 'real' public fears about crime, and in the thoroughly self-serving versions of this theory that have appeared in the media itself.
Tester doubts the social reality of moral panic because he doubts whether the media is capable of communicating issues of moral significance. 'Media significance means moral insignificance.' In other words, the media is less likely to create moral panics than 'moral boredom and dullness'. This is an extreme statement of the increasingly common view that we are experiencing a moral crisis which is, in essence, a crisis of moral language. Among moral philosophers, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that moral language has become devalued or dislocated, and Mary Maxwell has identified a 'moral inertia' resulting, in part, from 'the unavailability of words needed to express certain concepts . . . [or] The remedy for moral panic, according to this argument, was the language of citizenship, community and 'civic responsibility', of a 'moral order' stressing duties rather than rights, 'a coherent vocabulary', as The Times leader-writer called it on 23 May 1994, 'with which to develop these emerging ideas' of moral renewal. As part of this 'linguistic project', the term 'moral panic' itself had to be redefined as a form of civic consciousness, an expression of public anxiety rather than a conspiracy of elites or interestgroups.
Cohen's original set of synonyms -'moral panic . . . moral crusades or moral indignation . . . moral campaigns' -made it clear that a moral panic was a temporary burst of moral excitement, a diversion from serious moral discussion. Poticing the Crzsis similarly contrasted moral panic with 'sober, realistic appraisal'; and journalists in this tradition have done the same, stressing the need to 'separate the wheat of real moral concern from the chaff of moral panic' (Michael Ignatieff in the Guardian, 12 May 1981). McRobbie's criticism of the distinction between moral panic and the 'real' world is extremely telling here, and in this respect the 'grassroots' theory does mark a significant advance on its predecessors, in its integration of moral panics with the continuous process of moral discourse and practice. What we are dealing with, as Simon Watney observes, is not a string of 'discontinuous and discrete "moral panics", but rather the mobility of idew logical confrontation across the entire field of public representation' (Watney 1987: 42). But there are obvious difficulties in transplanting the language of 'moral panic' into this radically different context, as, for example, when the Archbishop of Canterbury, in his sermon on Easter Day 1993, equates moral panic with the instinctive human response to evil. Morality, it seems, naturally takes the form of panic:
